Where will you sail today? At the end of the day, write down what you discovered.
Where will you sail today? At the end of the day, write down what you discovered.
10) “Remember that failure is an event, not a person.”
9) “You will get all you want in life, if you help enough other people get what they want.”
8 ) “People often say motivation doesn’t last. Neither does bathing—that’s why we recommend it daily.”
7) “There has never been a statue erected to honor a critic.”
6) “People don’t buy for logical reasons. They buy for emotional reasons.”
5) “Expect the best. Prepare for the worst. Capitalize on what comes.”
4) “If you go looking for a friend, you’re going to find they’re scarce. If you go out to be a friend, you’ll find them everywhere.”
3) “A goal properly set is halfway reached.”
2) “Your attitude, not your aptitude, will determine your altitude.”
1) “If you can dream it, you can achieve it.”
While networking I have now begun to realise that as I approach the Senior Citizen's Age - I have started having my Senior Moments.
Just to explain what am I talking about :
1. senior moment A lapse of memory, logic or mental function which is atypical or unusual. The individual suffering the event, may not necessarily be advanced in age, although senior citizens are more likely to experience an occurrence.Mom had a "senior moment" yesterday when she poured laundry detergent into the dryer.I realised that this moment comes to all of us and age has nothing to do with it.
2. senior moment synonym of:brain fart and brain cramp Suddenly forgetting something you've....oh what's the word..known every other time, except for the moment someone's asking you. It happens to people 55 and older.I had a great example, and now I've forgot it. Must be having a senior moment. Yes. That's what I am talking about :)3. senior moment A time where a high school/college senior realize that they are a senior of their school,
and will soon be moving on to other things in the very near future.
Usually occurs at the end of the school, and signs include photography,
group discussions, and crying.
4. senior moment
a memory lapse, such as those experienced by the elderly
I think she must have had a senior moment when you put it in her pocket.
Not sure, if a cure exists. The best I do though, is to simply apologise.
With the demand-supply mismatch continuing in technical education, the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) has received 58 applications till date for closure of institutes across various disciplines. The applications for the 2013-14 academic year have come from across the country and includes five from Maharashtra. The numbers are expected to go up as colleges can apply till December-end.
“Applications for closure can be sent till December 31, 2012, and processing will be done from January 2013. So far, we have received equal number of applications for closure from engineering and management institutes,” said AICTE chairman S S Mantha.
The AICTE has received applications for shutting down 21 engineering institutes, 21 management institutes, 10 pharmacy institutes and six institutes offering masters degree in computer applications. As of now, the highest numbers have come Andhra Pradesh (seven), followed by five each from Maharashtra, Karnataka and Uttarakhand.
Bal Thackeray, a maverick politician who roused emotions on Marathi pride and catapulted Shiv Sena to power in Maharashtra in the 1990s, died in Mumbai on Saturday after having been critically ill for the past few days.
The 86-year-old cartoonist turned politician, known for his strong views and speaking his mind, sometimes bordering on the offensive, breathed his last at 3.30 pm at his residence 'Matoshree' in suburban Bandra.
"He had suffered a cardiac arrest. We could not revive him despite our best efforts. He breathed his last at around 3:30 pm," Dr Jalil Parkar, who treated the Sena supremo, told reporters after emerging from Thackeray residence on Saturday evening.
Ministry-wise PIB releases
--EU market definition still falls short of UPS, TNT lobbying positions - Source
--Statement sent to UPS and TNT sets out antitrust issues in at least 25 of 27 EU members
--Document stresses importance of competitive express parcel delivery sector for European economy
By Vanessa Mock
BRUSSELS--European Union regulators have warned that a planned deal to create Europe's largest package-delivery company raises competition problems in almost all 27 member states, according to a person familiar with the situation.
EU officials have broadened their definition of the market that is affected by the planned takeover of TNT Express NV (>> TNT EXPRESS) by United Parcel Service Inc. (>> United Parcel Service, Inc.), though didn't go nearly as far as what was pushed in the companies' recent lobbying. A key concern is the overnight delivery sector, where the two are among a handful of market leaders thanks to their wide networks.
The formal objections presented to the companies by the European Commission last month are likely to make it tougher for them to offer concessions that wouldn't undermine the commercial logic of the proposed 5.2 billion-euro deal revealed in April. Both companies have said they remain confident of closing the transaction early next year.
EU competition chief Joaquin Almunia warned last week that the proposed deal raises "serious competition concerns" and called for "substantial remedies," echoing his stance when reviewing last year's planned merger of NYSE Euronext (>> NYSE Euronext) and Deutsche Boerse AG (>> Deutsche Boerse AG), which collapsed because of antitrust issues.
The statement of objections sent to UPS and TNT by Mr. Almunia's team sets out antitrust issues in at least 25 of 27 European Union member states, according to the person who has reviewed the document.
"This would seem to suggest that UPS can no longer hope to clear the deal by offering country-by-country divestments, but instead would need to look at offering solutions for its entire network," the person said.
The formal document also reiterates the Commission's stance that UPS and TNT are two of just four so-called "market integrators"--alongside the DHL unit of Deutsche Post AG (>> Deutsche Post AG) and FedEx Corp. (>> FedEx Corporation)--that offer a one-stop shop for express parcel delivery thanks to their extensive road and air networks.
The Commission has also struck down the companies' argument that regulators should consider the dozens of firms providing door-to-door parcel delivery service in the EU as integrators providing a rival service.
The confidential document also stresses the importance of a competitive express parcel delivery sector for the European economy and highlights the high "barrier to entry," meaning that the market currently makes it hard for new entrants to compete against the four current integrators.
UPS said last week in a regulatory filing that it plans to respond to the Commission's concerns before the end of the year, and still aims to close the transaction in "early" 2013. The companies had previously hoped to finalize the deal by the end of 2012 before EU regulators opened a second-stage review of the plan.
The Commission has said it plans to make a final decision by early February.
As India [ Images ] failed in its negotiations with China, the 'border issue' became a Greek tragedy with a preordained outcome, notes Kishan S Rana.
Most Indians are convinced that the 1962 attack on our Himalayan frontier by China was an act of betrayal. Recent documents -- as they have emerged -- confirm the calculated nature of that attack and the months of planning that went into it.
The intent of "teaching India a lesson" underlay Chinese actions; the conjunction of international events, including the Sino-Soviet split, played a role. Did our own actions, inadvertently, also contribute to that outcome? Should we take them into account? This concluding part of three articles looks at the diplomatic exchanges, which was not covered in the first two pieces*.
First, the full story of Premier Zhou's April 1960 talks in Delhi [ Images ] has not yet emerged. In Negotiating for India (2006), Jagat S Mehta (JSM) lifted the curtain a little. Zhou arrived on April 17 and was expected to stay for two days; in the event he stayed for seven one-to-one exchanges with Nehru, with only interpreters present (Paranjpe and Chieh). JSM writes: In contrast to Zhou, "an ace diplomat, in total command of details (Nehru) did not have the matching capacity for marshaling facts".
Senior ministers (Morarji Desai, G B Pant, Krishna Menon "with or without the prime minister's approval") had separate meetings with Zhou and Chen Yi. After each meeting, Nehru summarised the discussion to Foreign Secretary S Dutt, in JSM's presence; Paranjpe prepared the minutes. None has been published.
At the penultimate meeting, Zhou put forward "the Six Points which he hoped would be endorsed by both the Prime Ministers. At the meeting, Nehru raised no objection as they seemed innocuous and unobjectionable". JSM felt "alarmed" on reading these. The first principle read: "There exists a dispute with regard to the boundary between the two sides." He rushed to the foreign secretary's residence, but the latter "did not wholly share my alarm", but told him to go to the prime minister. Nehru dismissed the idea and asserted that there is obviously a dispute, and then showed his "visage of anger".
The Cabinet foreign affairs committee met at the home of G B Pant, where Nehru summarised his discussions. As Nehru was to depart for the seventh and final meeting with Zhou, JSM "made bold to mention to the PM that consistent with past pronouncements, we cannot subscribe to the idea of a dispute mentioned in the Six Points. If we accept them then we cannot charge them with violation of our frontier.
The PM heard me and said nothing and got into his car." (p. 81-2) JSM adds: The foreign secretary "roundly admonished" him for daring to advise the prime minister, and that too in the presence of his Cabinet colleagues.
At that final meeting, Nehru told Zhou that he could not subscribe to the Six Points; just prior to his departure, Zhou announced these as a Chinese proposal. JSM has justified his action in terms of "an obligation to volunteer advice and dissent even if not asked".
If one side is convinced that its case is 100 per cent solid, and it can sustain that position against the other party on a bilateral issue, the above is perfectly logical. In negotiation theory, this is called "positional bargaining".
It works only if the other side capitulates, or if one can impose one's standpoint in some other manner. Of course, one may start a negotiation with a 100 per cent demand, but if one cannot offer territorial or some other concession that gives some satisfaction to the other side, the process can only result in failure, unless the other side gives in completely. Is there example of any country winning a negotiation in this fashion? If India could not do that, the border issue became a Greek tragedy, with a preordained outcome.
Second, when did we come to believe that we had a 100 per cent case on the border? We started with a flexible standpoint, especially in respect the Western sector (i.e. in Aksai Chin and its neighbourhood). Our maps of the early 1950s were imprecise; Nehru's early statements about Aksai Chin, that "not a blade of grass grows there", pointed to this. In the East, the McMahon line was always our bottom line. We came to our "positional bargaining" stance in the late 1950s, but the facts are hidden in our closed archives. How did this happen?
At the 1960 talks, JSM, who led the Indian team writes: " the Indian side was hemmed in by imposed political constraints", leading to the publication of two parallel reports, in one document. They furnished evidence "on which each side relied in support of its stand". The Indian side "were advocates in defence of a specified delineation already established and communicated in the PM's letters. The latter left not an iota of discretion for give or take".
Third, in July 1961, R K Nehru (RKN), secretary general in the ministry of external affairs, visited Beijing [ Images ] on the way back from Mongolia; our attempt at a dialogue resulted in acrimony. Indian records remain hidden, but the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War Project carries a long, incomplete note (provided by Beijing) covering a discussion on July 17, 1961, immediately following the Zhou-RKN meeting, when Ambassador G Parthasarathi met Asia Director Zhang of the Chinese foreign ministry. That rare, fascinating verbatim account shows the differing negotiation styles of the two sides.
Fourth, at the 1970 May Day parade, Chairman Mao shook hands with Indian chargé d'affaires Brajesh C Mishra (BCM) on the Tienanmen rostrum, saying: "My greetings to President Giri and to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi [ Images ]. Shall we keep on quarrelling like this?" For China that represented a serious initiative to resume dialogue, but before BCM could reach Delhi to report on this and offer his recommendations, Mao's words were leaked in the Indian media, and the gesture was trivialised as a "Mao smile".
BCM noted in his oral history account published by the Indian Foreign Affairs Journal that the leak came from the pro-Soviet lobby in the Indian hierarchy. (It is striking that in 1962-63, P K Banerjee, author of My Peking Memoirs of The Chinese Invasion of India, had a like view of such a lobby.) The net result was that an opening was missed; the Bangladesh crisis in the months that followed meant that it was only after 1972 that real India-China dialogue could be resumed.
In sum, we need to review our past diplomatic approaches, in cool and dispassionate fashion. New information that has emerged from diverse sources needs examination. Some primary material is in the Cold War Archives. Read, for instance, the long, hard-hitting Soviet record of Khrushchev's October 3, 1959 meeting with Mao where India figures prominently (digital collection: "Cold War in Asia"). John W Garver's long essay "China's Decision for War with India in 1962" (also on the net) is rich in citations from diverse Chinese sources, including material citing Politburo discussions.
No doubt equally relevant material is to be found in the archives of other foreign ministries that have been opened up. Above all, our own archives can answer many of the mysteries of the lead up to, and the aftermath of 1962.
Is it not high time that we rethink our total clampdown on India's China records? Why should the bulk of official papers of the Nehru and Indira Gandhi era be treated as private documents? When regimes in Beijing and Moscow [ Images ] open their historical records, must democratic India fear its own past?
The writer is a former ambassador, author, teacher and honorary fellow at Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi
ΨCSuiteMentor© ØMSME ⊕Startup ΘEnterpriseMentor ϖProBonoAdvisor βPolicy φPolitics ⊕Strategy ∅Thinker ϕArtist| Educator| |Advisor | Ex Censor | Excellence Assessor | Startup and C-Suite MentorEx MNC Director Startup and C-Suite Mentor